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I. Introduction
While it may not be strictly accu-
rate to describe European Commu-
nity law as "federal" in advance of
the political initiative necessary to
found a "United States of Europe,"
it must be recognized that the Treaty
of Rome' is, in a sense, a federal
constitution and has transferred con-
siderable legislative powers from the
individual states to the European in-
stitutions. Under the treaty, federal
law is supreme and has exclusive
competence in almost all matters
touching upon the regulation of the
community's trading relations with
other countries, the movement of
goods, services, persons and capi-
tal between the member states and
the policies that are necessary to
achieve and maintain a single uni-
fied market.
There will be no attempt here to
give any insight into the national
laws of the nine member states'
of the EEC; it is intended only to
make some brief introductory re-
marks as to some aspects of EEC fed-
eral ("community") law.
The attorney who anticipates the
need for advice as to community law
should have little difficulty in find-
ing a European firm with the requi-
site expertise since EEC law now has
a place in the curriculum at most
European law schools. It should be
noted that, as yet, there is no such
animal as a "European lawyer"; no
single qualification suffices for all the
member states, due in no small part
to the conceptual gulf (be it real
or only perceived) between the Com-
mon and Civil law systems. Never-
theless there is already EEC legis-
lation which gives to a lawyer who
is qualified in one member state cer-
tain limited and temporary rights in
other community countries. -'
I. Signed by the original six member states in
1957.
2. Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Nether-
lands, Denmark, Ireland and The United
Kingdom.
3. Council Directive No. 77/249/EEC, 0.1.
1977 L78/17
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As for self-help the basic sources
of European federal law are to be
found in the libraries of many U.S.
law schools. Community legislation4
is to be found in the "Official Jour-
nal" and there are two reporter
systems for the opinions of the com-
munity's supreme court, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice, which sits in
Luxembourg.'
II. Antitrust
The space devoted to EEC antitrust
policy in the Treaty of Rome belies its
complexity, growing sophistication
and the severity with which its
transgressors may be dealt with. The
pivotal provisions are EEC: Arts. 85,
86; the former dealing with restric-
tive practices, the latter with aspects
of monopoly power.
Art. 85(l) The following shall be pro-
hibited as incompatible with the com-
mon market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerned prac-
tices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restric-
tion or distortion of competition within
the common market. ...
Art. 86 Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a sub-
stantial part of it shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the common market
in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States....
A. Nature and Scope
Central to the definition of such
prohibited conduct is the require-
ment that it "may affect trade be-
tween Member States." Thus the
federal European antitrust law is
only concerned with anticompetitive
behavior which may hinder inter-
state trade.
This has the important conse-
quence that these federal rules do
not in any way affect the application
of national competition laws which
are designed to safeguard intra-
state trade. Thus the question as
to whether or not the conduct in
Europe of a U.S. exporter offends
against, for example, the German
Geselz gegen Wetiberwerisbleschrank-
igen 1957 or the U.K. Compelition
Act 1980 is in no way determinative
as to the applicability of the EEC
competition rules. It should also be
noted that although the EEC prohibi-
tion is concerned with conduct that
may affect inter-state trade, there is
no requirement that the parties to,
say, a restrictive agreement are from
different member states"; indeed
there is no requirement that the par-
ties are from any member state, thus
giving the EEC rules at least the po-
tential for extra-territorial effect.7
B. The Regulatory Agency
Charged with the administration
and enforcement of the federal anti-
trust law is the European Commis-
sion. Subordinate legislation" makes
the Commission investigator, prose-
cutor, judge and sentencing author-
ity in all EEC anti-trust matters, sub-
ject to review before the European
Court of justice.
The Commission has power to re-
quest information from undertak-
ings, to make either announced or
unannounced on-the-spot investiga-
tions and to examine and copy docu-
ments. It has only recently begun to
make extensive use of these powers
and some issues - for example,
whether there is a right to examine
communications between attorney
and client9 - have yet to be clarified
by the European Court. In practice
there is considerable cooperation be-
tween the Commission and national
antitrust authorities in investiga-
tions; although where a suspected
undertaking is established outside
the territory of the EEC, the Com-
mission relies heavily upon "infor-
mation received." In such cases
the Commission is often powerless
to protect its source; thus, in the
celebrated "Vitamins" case"', the
Hoffmann-La Roche employee who
provided the Commission with
much crucial information was sub-
sequently convicted of industrial
espionage by a Swiss court.'"
C. Sanctions
In cases of violation of the
Community competition rules, the
Commission may issue a 'cease and
desist' order as either a final or
interim measure and may impose
either procedural or substantive
fines'; procedural in that an under-
taking may be fined for failure to
supply information or documents,
for supplying incorrect information
or for failure to obey a 'cease and de-
sist' order. Substantive in the sense
that a fine may be imposed for the
anti-competitive behavior itself.
As an example of the latter, the
European subsidiary and three ex-
clusive distributors of the 'Pioneer'
electronics company were recently
fined a total of EUA 6,950,000 (ap-
proximately $10 million) for dividing
up the European market along na-
tional boundaries. 3
4. -EC: Art. 189- regulations," "directives"
and "decisions." Depending upon the sub-
ject matter either the Commission or the
Council of Ministers has legislative com-
petence. Community institutions which are
elected (the EuroFean Parliament) or repre-
sentative of interested parties (e.g. the Eco-
nomic and Social Committee) have merely a
strong consultative role.
5. The present writer has been able to make
use of the extensive resources of the law
library at St. Louis University, which in-
cludes most of the important secondary
sources in addition to the basic texts.
(i. Blrasse'rie de llaecht n. Wilkin-/anssen (Nii. 1).
7 C.M.L.R. 26 (1968).
7. Imperial Chemical Ilustries .1d. n EEC
Comnnissu', I I) C.M.L.R. 557 (1972); United
Brands Comparia and, Uithd Brals C, 1ine-
tal V .311 C C isn, 21 C.M.L.R. 429)
(1978); II,,ffinap-La Roirh, & 0,. At, v. EEC
Copmmission. 26 C.M.L.R. 211 (1979).
8. The principal legislation is Reg. 17/1962;
O.J. 1959-1962, 87.
9. Re An investigation At AM & S Europe
Ltd., O.J. 1979 L 199/31.
10. hffinan,n-La Roche & Co. AG . EEC Com-
nfishm, 20 C.M.L.R. 211 (1979).
II. Stanley Adams R. Staatsanuualshaft es
KantiIs lfaselstadt. 23 C.M.L.R. 480 (1978).
12. Reg. 17 Arts. 3, 15, 16.
13. Re 'Pioneer' li-Fi Equipment, O.J. 198(1
L60/2 1.
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Since an "agreement" covered by
EEC Art. 85 is "void,' 4 that fact may
be pleaded before a national court as
a defense to an alleged breach of con-
tract. Furthermore since the conduct
covered by EEC Art. 85, 86 is "pro-
hibited" a third party is able to plead
such conduct as a defense to, say, a
patent infringement action. It is also
thought that EEC Arts. 85, 86 are not
purely defensive in nature but may
ground an action in tort brought by a
third party whose economic interests
have been injured by the prohibited
antitrust violation.' 5 It should be
noted that Community law does not,
of itself, give any right to punitive or
multiple damage claims.
D. Substantive Issues
Whether there has been a breach
of the substantive EEC anti-trust
rules depends upon the answers to a
series of complex factual, legal and
economic questions. It is intended
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The attorney, faced with a ques-
tion as to the legality of his client's
proposed conduct, must look not
only to the published decisions of
the Commission and the now volu-
minous case law of the European
Court but also to non-legislative no-
tices published by the Commission
giving its view as to the applicability
of EEC: Art. 85 to certain categories
of agreement.
(i) Plurality of Undertakings; for Art.
85 to be applicable there must be
some anti-competitive activity en-
tered into by "undertakings." This
precondition is not satisfied if the
undertakings are part of one eco-
nomic entity; thus agreements be-
tween parent corporations and sub-
sidiariesft or between corporations
and employees (including some
commercial agents') will not fall
under the prohibition. EEC: Art.
86 does not contain a plurality
requirement.
(ii) The Rule of Reason; a de injimis
rule applies to practices that do
not appreciably restrict inter-state
competition. '5
(iii) Prohibited agreements; under-
standably the Commission has not
tolerated any agreement that would
grant to an undertaking absolute ter-
ritorial protection and thus threaten
the carefully established unity of the
common market. There has thus
been an attack on all vertical dis-
tribution agreements, whether "ex-
clusive"19 or "selective," 20 which
contain export bans or deterrents. 2'
In addition the Commission has in-
vestigated both horizontal and verti-
cal agreements dealing with, for ex-
ample, joint ventures, specialization,
research and development, exchange
of information as well as more ob-
vious restrictive practices relating to
price-fixing and market-sharing.
(iv) Block exemptions; a limited class
of agreements, although prohibited
by Art. 85(1) are exempted by spe-
cific legislative measures. These so-
called "block-exemptions" apply to
certain categories of distribution, 2
and specialization 23 agreements; leg-
islation is expected shortly to deal
with patent licensing agreements. 4
(v) Individual exemptions; if a
prohibited agreement is formally
notified2" to the Commission an in-
dividual exemption may be granted.
Aside from the preconditions set out
in EEC Art. 85(3),26 the attorney
must once again turn to the reported
decisions and cases to gain insight
into the criteria used by the Com-
mission. It should be noted that in
most cases no individual exemption
may be granted without compliance
with the formal notification proce-
dure. An additional incentive to
notify is that for the period between
notification and decision there is an
immunity from fines. 27
(vi) Article 86; this has proved, so far,
to be of less importance in encourag-
ing free competition in Europe. The
Commission has tended to empha-
size the role of Art. 85 in its work,
due in part no doubt to the fact that
14. EEC: Art. 85(2).
15. Per Lord Denning M.R., Application des Gaz
v Falks Verilas, 119741 Ch. 381, 396 (Court
of Appeal, England).
16. Buelh hlinport Co. v. GL Import-Export, 11
C.M.L.R. 91 (1972).
17. Communication on Exclusive Agency
Contracts Made with Commercial Agents
O.J. 1962 2921; Suiker Uih' . EEC Cippmnis-
sion, 17 C.M.L.R. 295 (1976).
18. Commission notice concerning agree-
ments of minor importance; O.J. 1977 C
313/3; Vilk '. Vervaecke, 8 C.M.L.R. 273
(1969).
19. E.g. Etallissenents Consten SA and Grundi,-
Verkatifs GmbH v. EEC Conimnission, 5
C.M.L.R. 418 (1966).
20, E.g, Re BMW, O.J. 1975 L29/1 (although an
individual exemption was granted).
21. A. Bulloch & Co. v. The Distillers Co,. Ltd.,
O.J. 1978 L50/16.
22. Reg. 67/67; 0.). 1967 10.
23. Reg. 2779/72, O.J. 1972 (28-30 Dec.) 80
as amended by Reg. 2903/77, O.J. 1977
L338/14.
24. Draft Regulation, O.J. 1979 L58/12.
25. Reg. 17; Reg. 27/62, O.J. 1959-1962 132;
Reg. 1133/68, 0.J. 1968 L189/1; Reg. 1966/
75 0.J. 1975 L172/11,
26. E.g. the restrictive agreement is necessary
for technical progress and is of benefit to
the consumer.
27. Reg. 17 Art. 15(5)(a).
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Art. 86 does not control monopoly
power per se and has proved to be a
less than effective tool for the control
of mergers and takeovers. 2"
Nevertheless, although proving
the existence of a "dominant posi-
tion" continues to involve a daunt-
ing legal and economic examination
of market structures, it is now well-
established that Art. 86 is capable
of striking down not only behavior
which is abusive per se but also more
general anti-competitive activities. -9
It is also becoming clear that
Art. 86 may be an effective weapon
for controlling the activities of
some multinational corporations; in
recent cases the Commission has
successfully challenged a fidelity
rebate scheme operated by Hoff-
man-La Roche-3 0 and United Brands'
European marketing strategy for
bananas. -"j
III. Intellectual Property
Two themes dominate any dis-
cussion of the impact of European
federal law on intellectual property
rights. The movement towards the
abandonment of national rights in
favor of a single community right;
and second the extent to which na-
tional rights must be restricted in the
interim.
A. One Patent or Nine? -
The New European Systems
For the foreseeable future the indi-
vidual patent systems of the member
states of the European Community
will continue in existence. The U.S.
holder who requires protection for
property right when he commences
to trade with the Community may,
therefore, continue to apply for na-
tional patents in the European states
in which he considers himself likely
to do business.
However, a complex revolution
is under way. The U.S.A. and the
member states of the EEC are among
the signatories to the world-wide
Patent Cooperation Treaty 32 (PCT)
which provides for a single filing
system notwithstanding the number
of individual national patents ap-
plied for. If the application is made
to the European office of the PCT
(Munich) and the patent application
concerns a European state (including
all the EEC states) then the provi-
sions of the European Patent Con-
vention" - (EPC) come into effect.
Under the EPC there is not merely a
unified filing system (as under PCT)
but a unified system up to the grant
of the patent.
28. Europelnialhige and Continental Can . EEC
Comimission, 12 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973).
29. E.,j' HofinanisLa Roche Co. AG . EEC Coin-
mnisiwn, 26 C.M.L.R. 211 (1979).
30. 1Hoffimaii-La RIche Co. AG t,. EEC Coniiiis-
shin, 2h C.M.L.R. 211 (1979).
31, Uniited Brands CaimpanYi and U.hlhd Brands4
Cimlip'ntal BV . EEC Coimmission, 21
C.M.L.R. 421) (1978).
32. Washington; )une 19, 1970. 9 Int. Legal
Materials 978 (1970).
33. Munich, Oclober 5, 1973. 13 Int. Legal
Materials 268 (1974).
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The most important step, how-
ever, is the introduction of a Com-
munity patent. Under the Commu-
nity Patent Convention14 there will
be a single supra-national patent for
the member states of the EEC. Thus
any valid application made under
the EPC for a patent in an EEC state
will lead to the grant of a single
patent covering the whole territory
of the EEC.
B. Restrictions on the Exercise of
Intellectual Property Rights
The airn of the EEC is to provide
and protect a single unified market
for goods. Although the intellectual
property rights granted by the na-
tional laws of the member states are
expressly protected by the Treaty
of Rome, -'- the European Court has
consistently refused to permit the
holders of such rights to use them so
as to partition the EEC for their own
marketing purposes.
Space does not permit a full exam-
ination of the jurisprudence of the
court; however, it is hoped to give
an indication from some of the lead-
ing cases as to the devices that have
been impugned and also, perhaps, a
reassurance that, aside from such
devices, the intellectual property
rights granted by state laws are still
respected by European federal law.
In Deutsche Graitinopton, .6 Metro,
the West German supermarket chain,
refused to comply with Deutsche
Grammophon's retail price mainte-
nance scheme. Starved of cheap sup-
plies in Germany, Metro used a
Swiss intermediary to acquire the
products from Deutsche Grammo-
phon's French subsidiary. Under
German law the import of such
goods infringed Deutsche Grammo-
phon's copyright. Art. 85 could not
aid Metro, since there was no plu-
rality of undertakings, merely an
"agreement" between parent and
subsidiary. The court therefore
turned to EEC: Art. 30, as qualified
by Art. 36(1):
Quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent
effect shall ... be prohibited between
Member States.
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall
not preclude prohibitions or resiric-
tions on imports ... justified on
grounds of ... the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property.
Faced with this dilemma the court
seems to have adopted the well
known "exhaustion of rights" doc-
trine. • 7 The court seemed to reason
that community law protected only
"unexhausted" intellectual property
rights. Once a product protected by
the right had been marketed by or
with the consent of the holder of the
right in a member state of the com-
munity then his rights in all other
community states were exhausted.
The subsequent case of Centrafan
BV v. Anerican Hoine Prouivcts 3 1
concerned a sedative, produced by
the American Home Products Group
(AMH), the active ingredient of
which was oxazepamum. In the Ben-
elux countries .9 AMH sold the drug
under their trademark 'Seresta.' In
the United Kingdom AMH sold the
drug tinder their trademark 'Serenid
D.' Serenid and Seresta had identical
therapeutic effects despite a slight
difference in taste. Centrafarm, the
Dutch pharmaceutical retailer, pur-
chased Serenid in the United King-
dom at a lower price than it could
obtain Seresta in Holland. However,
since Serenid was unknown in Hol-
land, Centrafarm repackaged it and
affixed the Seresta mark prior to
selling the product. When AMH's in-
fringement action was referred to
Luxembourg the European Court ap-
peared to recognize that this was not
a case of exhaustion of rights; after
all AMH had not marketed Seresta in
the United Kingdom. Instead the
court relied upon the qualification
to EEC: Art. 36(1) contained in Art.
36(2):
Such prohibitions or restrictions shall
not, however, constitute a means of ar-
bitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member
States.
The court was of the opinion that
this provision was apt to cover the
case provided that there was evi-
dence that AMH was attempting to
partition the market and that the re-
packaging was executed under cer-
tain conditions.
In cases such as these the Euro-
pean Court has been at pains to
point out that attempts to partition
the common market along national
frontiers will not be tolerated even
if the effect is to reduce the value
of some intellectual property rights
recognized by the national laws of
the community states. Throughout,
however, the court has also stressed
that aside from these extreme cases
the national intellectual property
rights will be inviolate.
In EMI 7. CBS411 the early twenti-
eth-century history of a fledgling rec-
ord industry threatened to return to
haunt the multinationals that control
it today. Before the First World War
the Columbia Phonograph Company
General registered the trademark
'Columbia' in the U.S.A. and sever-
al Europe .n countries, and subse-
quently transferred its European in-
terests to an English subsidiary.
In 1922 the English subsidiary
parted company from its parent and
from that time the ownership of the
American and European Columbia
trademarks has been separate. By
1974 the American mark was owned
34. December 15, 1975; O.J. 1976 L17/1. Other
connit intellectual property rights are
to be introduced; see e.g. "Memorandum
on the Creation of an EEC trademark,"
Bull. E.C. Supp. 8/76.
35. EEC: Arts. 36(l), 222.
36. Deutsche Graminophon GinIH z. Metro-SB-
Grosstiirkte Gmbt' & Co. KG, 10 C.M.L.R.
631 (1971),
37 Belts , Wilinoti, 6 L.R. Ch. App. 239
(1870); Curtiss Aeroplane and Motor Corpora-
tios Y,. Untited Eingineering Corporation, 266 F
71(1920).
38. 24 C.M.L.R. 326 (1979).
39. Belgium, Luxembourg and The Nether-
lands.
40. EMI Records Ltd. . CBS United Kin'doum
Ltd., CBS Graimpoofopt A/S and CBS Schall-
plattert GnifH, 18 C.M.L.R. 235 (1976).
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by CBS Inc., the European marks by
EMI Records Ltd.
Litigation was commenced when
the UK, Danish and German sub-
sidiaries of CBS began to import
and market American made Colum-
bia records without removing the
Columbia trademark. Since it was
unlikely that there was any subsist-
ing agreement between the parties
such as to bring Art. 85 into play and
as there was no exhaustion by EMI of
its rights, CBS relied upon "common
origin," a doctrine akin to exhaus-
tion to the effect that a right may be
"exhausted" not only by marketing
by the holder but also marketing
by the independent lawful holder of
an identical right in another coun-
try when such rights had a common
origin.
The decision of the court to the ef-
fect that European federal law would
not interfere with EMI's infringe-
ment action has an implication far
beyond the common origin doctrine.
The court's decision was based upon
the fact that a victory for EMI would
not affect trade "between member-
states" (EEC: Art. 30); it is, therefore,
arguable that the same answer would
be given in an exhaustion case. Thus
if CBS had owned both the American
and European rights to the trade-
mark it would seem that although,
because of the exhaustion doctrine,
it would not have been possible for
them to prevent parallel imports
from, say, France into Gemiany, it
could have stopped cheap parallel
imports into Europe from the U.S.A.
- in other words there is no doctrine
of world-wide exhaustion.
It may be concluded that the U.S.
holder of an intellectual property
right who decides to do business in
Europe may protect his European
marketing organization from third
parties intending to undercut him;
the caveat should of course be added
that care should be taken to avoid
any European antitrust violation in
the operation of such a scheme. 41
IV. Conclusion
The growth of community law
should not deter the U.S. business-
man from entering the EEC market-
place. Although some of his tradi-
tional trading practices may have to
be curtailed, this is equally true for
his competitors. On the positive side
there are some very real benefits to
be had as a result of the unifying
force that is European federal law.
As for the American attorney it is to
be hoped that he will not only be in-
trigued by the emergence of this new
field of law, but will also come to
regard it as a fertile ground for his
talents.
.11. 1,g. l' Who Grimp I.mih'd and 1'gldor
C tL.iihd 1'. stage One I R'oJ ,in'd Lhnimhd, 28
C.ML.R. .129 1 lqSo), E'.nglish IHigh Coulrt.
impressive suiteunusualopportunity
Exquisitely decorated offices with
unique architectural features
private entrance on Fourth Street
offering flexibility of
room combinations up to
7 private offices with
StP7 secretary locations
R I at Competitive Rates
-EL I ~ Additional Options Available





319 N. Fourth Street @ St. Louis, Mo.
DIRECT INQUIRIES TO 241-8442
ST. LOUIS BAR JOURNAL
